The United States is nearing a significant election period, and various state officials are voicing increasing concern over the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s ability and dependability, especially due to reduced personnel and persistent distrust stemming from the policies of the Trump administration. Though DHS continues to be a vital federal agency responsible for supporting states in securing elections against both internal and external dangers, doubts have arisen about its perceived trustworthiness and operational efficacy.
In recent months, a number of state election leaders have voiced apprehension about relying on DHS’s cybersecurity and infrastructure security divisions, citing concerns that stem from both institutional shifts during the previous administration and ongoing resource limitations. Their worries highlight a broader issue in America’s decentralized electoral system: how state and federal agencies collaborate to protect one of democracy’s most essential functions.
During the time when Donald Trump was President, there were often disputes between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and state election officials. Although the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) was established in 2018 as a part of DHS to help safeguard essential infrastructures like election systems, Trump’s comments about the validity of elections often opposed CISA’s public declarations.
In the aftermath of the 2020 election, CISA officials asserted that the vote was secure and that there was no evidence of widespread fraud. This directly contradicted Trump’s claims of electoral misconduct, leading to the firing of CISA Director Christopher Krebs, whose dismissal shocked cybersecurity experts and public officials alike. That moment marked a turning point in the perception of DHS’s neutrality and reliability among some state governments.
Currently, despite the change in leadership, the agency continues to deal with ongoing doubts, particularly from individuals who feel that political influence might have affected its autonomy. Consequently, some states remain cautious about completely trusting DHS for assistance related to elections, even as cyber threats to voter data, election systems, and public confidence increase.
Compounding the trust issue is a decline in staffing across key divisions within DHS that provide cybersecurity assistance to state and local governments. According to internal assessments and public reporting, many cybersecurity roles remain vacant, slowing the agency’s ability to offer timely support or deploy resources during critical election periods.
For example, election officials in several states report delays in receiving DHS vulnerability assessments or intelligence briefings. These services—once seen as essential tools in preparing for cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns—have become harder to access due to limited personnel and strained coordination between federal and state actors.
In certain situations, states have looked to private cybersecurity companies or set up standalone teams to address what is seen as a lack of federal assistance. Although these actions can offer important safeguards, they might also result in uneven standards and disjointed security practices across different areas.
As a reaction to their worries, state election authorities have aimed to enhance their internal cybersecurity skills and establish collaborations with reliable federal or non-governmental organizations. A number of states have grown their election security departments, employed specialized information security personnel, and boosted spending on employee education and technological improvements.
Additionally, some secretaries of state have pursued collaboration with the National Guard’s cybersecurity units or academic institutions with expertise in election integrity. These alternatives allow states to retain greater control over their systems while still benefiting from external expertise.
Even with this change, numerous states recognize that DHS still possesses useful assets, especially in areas such as threat intelligence, vulnerability assessments, and collaboration with intelligence organizations. The difficulty is in reestablishing a cooperative relationship that allows these resources to be both reliable and efficient.
Since the transition to the Biden administration, CISA has made visible efforts to restore its standing as a nonpartisan protector of election security. Under new leadership, the agency has launched outreach initiatives aimed at reassuring state officials of its commitment to transparency and neutrality. These include regular threat briefings, public webinars, and regional security summits tailored to the needs of local election administrators.
CISA has also highlighted the significance of its position as a “reliable partner,” providing complementary services like risk evaluations, intrusion detection instruments, and guidelines for safeguarding election infrastructure. Nevertheless, the lasting effects of past disputes still influence the way certain states view and employ these resources.
To address these challenges, the agency is working to expand its staffing pipeline and improve interagency coordination, but rebuilding trust remains a long-term project. Election security officials note that consistency, clear communication, and political independence will be key to strengthening these partnerships moving forward.
As election-related cyber threats continue to evolve, the importance of cohesive federal-state collaboration becomes even more critical. State systems remain frequent targets of ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, and influence operations originating from abroad. Without unified defense strategies and shared information channels, the nation’s electoral integrity may become increasingly vulnerable.
Experts caution that a disjointed approach in the security environment—where individual states operate autonomously with minimal collaboration—may lead to vulnerabilities that opponents can take advantage of. DHS, due to its extensive responsibilities and access to national intelligence, is distinctly placed to offer support for a coordinated response.
Yet that potential will only be realized if state officials trust the agency’s motives, capabilities, and professionalism. As one election official put it, “We don’t have the luxury of mistrust when the stakes are this high—but we do have to be cautious about who we trust.”
With the 2024 general election on the horizon, state and local election officials are working to finalize their cybersecurity strategies and logistical preparations. Whether DHS will play a central role in those plans remains an open question for several states, especially those still grappling with concerns over staffing and past political interference.
Some lawmakers have called for additional funding to bolster both DHS and state election offices, recognizing that robust defense requires investment at all levels. Others advocate for legislative reforms to clarify the agency’s responsibilities and insulate its leadership from political pressure.
Meanwhile, CISA continues to engage stakeholders, refine its messaging, and expand its support services in an effort to regain the confidence of all 50 states. The ultimate test will be whether those efforts translate into effective, trusted collaboration when the next major election cycle begins.
The legacy of past controversies and ongoing resource constraints have left some states questioning the reliability of the Department of Homeland Security’s role in election protection. While the agency remains a critical asset in the broader cybersecurity landscape, its ability to regain full trust from state officials depends on transparency, staffing improvements, and a demonstrated commitment to nonpartisan support.
As voting becomes increasingly intricate and cyber threats more advanced, it is crucial for all levels of government to collaborate in a safe manner. Lacking this cooperation, weaknesses extend beyond just the technological sphere—they become systemic, undermining the core of democratic engagement.
