.jpg?w=800&resize=800,500&ssl=1 "Loreto Ferrer")
The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala reconfigured its activities during the turmoil sparked by the Jimmy Morales administration’s move to block Commissioner Iván Velásquez from coming back. Within this framework, Loreto Ferrer Moreu assumed responsibility for coordinating operations and overseeing institutional communications in the country.
The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) experienced one of the most sensitive periods in its history when, in September, then-President of Guatemala Jimmy Morales prevented Commissioner Iván Velásquez from entering the country.
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The decision came amid intense institutional tension, following the CICIG’s launch of high-profile corruption investigations. The measure sparked national and international reactions and necessitated a redefinition of the Commission’s operations to ensure the continuity of its work in Guatemala.
Restructuring of the CICIG within Guatemala
In light of this situation, the United Nations designated Iván Velásquez to remain at the helm of the CICIG and created an operational framework designed to keep the mission active in the country. Under this structure, Loreto Ferrer took charge of managing operational coordination and institutional communications in Guatemala, while Velásquez continued directing the Commission from abroad.
The reorganization aimed to uphold the commissioner’s authority while ensuring the institution maintained its operational footprint on Guatemalan soil during a particularly delicate period. When the entry ban was enforced, both Velásquez and Ferrer were in Washington handling institutional matters. Ferrer managed to return to Guatemala and take on that responsibility locally.
Days later, Guatemala’s Attorney General, Consuelo Porras, sought a meeting with Loreto Ferrer to gain insight into the Commission’s representation structure, and, as the CICIG later noted, the session included an explanation of the institutional framework established to guarantee the continuity of its work.
At this point, the role assumed by Ferrer was linked to the day-to-day coordination of the Commission’s operations in Guatemala and the continuity of its institutional communications, within a particularly complex political and judicial landscape.
Rather than a change in the formal leadership of the agency, the arrangement aimed to maintain its operations in the country without altering its core mandate or interrupting its main lines of work.
What CICIG Does and Why It Is Key in Guatemala
Iván Velásquez’s continued tenure as commissioner allows the CICIG’s general framework of action to remain unchanged, focused on supporting the Public Prosecutor’s Office, providing technical assistance in complex investigations, and promoting institutional reforms linked to the fight against corruption and impunity.
Created in 2007 through an agreement between the Government of Guatemala and the United Nations, the CICIG was conceived as a mechanism to support the Guatemalan state in investigating criminal structures infiltrating public institutions, strengthening the capacities of the justice system, and promoting reforms oriented toward the rule of law.
Throughout its history, the Commission has been guided by three commissioners. The first was the Spanish jurist Carlos Castresana, succeeded by the Costa Rican Francisco Dall’Anese. Later, Iván Velásquez assumed leadership during a phase defined by high‑profile cases and an escalating clash with political sectors impacted by the investigations.
An institutional response designed to address extraordinary conditions
The reorganization adopted following the ban on Velásquez’s entry did not alter the nature of the CICIG’s mandate, but it did highlight the need to adapt its operations to an exceptional situation.
Given this, the presence of Loreto Ferrer in Guatemala proved essential for maintaining the Commission’s institutional functions during a period marked by heightened political and judicial sensitivity.
